




erhaps the most fundamental question in monetary economics pertains
to the role of the government in providing money. A widely held view
amongeconomistsisthatthesupplyofmediaofexchangeisanactivity
that should not be left to the private sector. Indeed, even Milton Friedman,
who in most respects has viewed the economic role of the government quite
narrowly, argues in Friedman (1960) that the provision of money is fraught
withpeculiarmarketfailuresandthatthegovernmentshouldhaveamonopoly
in the supply and control of the stock of circulating currency.
Monetary systems that include the private provision of circulating media
of exchange were not uncommon in the past. In the United States, most of
the stock of currency in circulation prior to the Civil War consisted of notes
issued by state-chartered banks. The U.S. pre–Civil War monetary system
has been judged by some, but not all, as chaotic (Rolnick et al.1997; Rolnick
andWeber 1983, 1984), since it included thousands of note-issuing banks and
the quality of these notes was difﬁcult to distinguish. Counterfeiting was a
problem, and there was sometimes poor information on a particular bank’s
chances of defaulting. However, the Suffolk Banking System in pre–Civil
War New England is thought to have functioned quite efﬁciently (see Smith
andWeber [1998]). In addition, the monetary system in place in Canada prior
to 1935 featured private note issue by a small number of chartered banks, and
this system also appears to have worked quite well (see Williamson [1999]
and Champ, Smith, and Williamson [1996]).
Private money systems are not just of historical interest. In the United
States,thegovernmentmonopolyontheissueofcirculatingmediaofexchange
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resulted from the federal taxation after the Civil War of the notes issued by
state-chartered banks, and from the elimination of the supply of government
bonds qualifying as backing for notes issued by national banks. As argued by
Schuler (2001), all serious federal impediments to private bank note issue in
the United States were removed in 1976 and 1994 (also see Lacker [1996]).
Thus,itwouldseemthatprivatebanksintheUnitedStatesarecurrentlyfreeto
issue circulating pieces of paper, though how U.S. regulators would respond
to private note issue is uncertain. New transactions technologies also give
ﬁnancial institutions the capability to issue private electronic monies, such as
stored-value cards, and several banks have conducted market trials of such
products.
The purpose of this article is to study some of the beneﬁts and costs of
private money issue. The key beneﬁt of privately issued money is that these
private liabilities can intermediate productive assets, much as the deposit lia-
bilities of private banks do. Economic efﬁciency is enhanced if private money
is permitted, as this private money is backed by productive investment, which
ultimately enhances production and welfare. If private money is banned, then
circulating currency takes the form of barren, unbacked ﬁat money. However,
one cost of having circulating private money is that it can be more easy to
counterfeit than ﬁat money. If counterfeiting is not very difﬁcult, then it can
have negative ramiﬁcations for social welfare.
I explore these issues here using a search model of money. Early versions
of these monetary search models were developed by Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989, 1993), with later developments by Trejos and Wright (1995) and
Shi (1995). Some of the ideas in this article are closely related to those
inWilliamson (1999) andTemzelides andWilliamson (2001b). In a monetary
searchmodel,economicagentstypicallyﬁnditdifﬁculttogettogethertotrade
and make transactions, and there are limits on the ﬂows of information. These
are frictions which the use of money can help to overcome in the model—and
in reality.
My ﬁrst step will be to investigate the properties of the model when coun-
terfeiting is not possible. I will show that government-supplied ﬁat money
in this context is always detrimental to social welfare. Fiat money displaces
private money, resulting in less investment and production and in lower wel-
fare. If the counterfeiting of private money is possible, then with the cost of
counterfeiting sufﬁciently low, monetary exchange may be supported only if
private money is prohibited.
In Section 1 I construct the basic model, and ﬁrst assume that there is no
opportunityfortheissueofcounterfeits. Ithenstudythenatureofequilibrium
in this model and show that, in the absence of counterfeiting, it is inefﬁcient
for ﬁat money to circulate. In the second section, I permit the costly issue of
counterfeit private money and show that the potential for counterfeiting can
lead to a classic type of market failure, much as in the “lemons” model of
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1. A MONETARY SEARCH MODEL WITH PRIVATE MONEY
AND FIAT MONEY
The ﬁrst step will be to study how an economy works when it is possible for
banks to issue private monies that can circulate as media of exchange, and
where economic agents can also use ﬁat money in exchange. In this basic
model, there are no private information frictions, and there is no potential for
counterfeiting.
Inbasicsearchmodelsofmoney,threekeyassumptionsareusuallymade:
(i) people have difﬁculty meeting to carry on economic exchange, (ii) there is
randomnessinvolvedinhowpeoplemakecontact,and(iii)peoplehavelimited
information about what others are doing. These three assumptions capture
important elements of real-world economic activity and economic exchange
that help explain the existence and use of money in developed economies.
Assumption (i) is realistic, as it is clearly costly in terms of time and
resources for people to get together to trade goods and assets. Shopping takes
time, and it is impossible to be in two places at once. While internet shopping
hasreducedshoppingcostsdramatically, physicalgoodsarecostlytoshipand
cannot be delivered immediately. Assets appear to be less costly to trade than
goods,astradeinassetstypicallyinvolvesonlyachangeinanelectronicrecord
of ownership. For example, to trade shares on the NewYork Stock Exchange,
one needs only to communicate with a broker. However, asset exchanges are
still costly, and people do not have access to the communication technology
required to make some kinds of asset trades at all times and places.
Assumption (ii) is probably the least realistic of the above three assump-
tions, for most individuals exercise much thought and planning in determin-
ing when they will trade goods and assets. For example, an individual’s food
purchases might involve no randomness at all. He or she plans to visit the
supermarket regularly on a particular day of the week, draws up a shopping
list, ﬁlls it at the supermarket, and returns home. However, people often ﬁnd
themselves in circumstances where they need to make unplanned purchases
or sales of goods and assets. A car might break down, requiring one to hire
a tow truck and rent a car; an unexpected illness might require that a person
sell some stocks and bonds from his or her asset portfolio; a person might
ﬁnd that the supermarket has stocked some unusual food that he or she has a
strong preference for and make an unanticipated purchase. Assumption (iii)
is clearly realistic, for it is impossible to know all the intricate details of the
economic interactions of all the people living in one’s own city or town, let
alone of all the people living in the world.
I will now describe the model environment, which will consist of a de-
scriptionofthepopulationofeconomicagents,thepreferencesoftheseagents,
the available technology, the endowments that are available to produce goods
satisfying agents’preferences, and how economic agents can interact. There










where E0 is the expectation operator, conditional on information available to
the agent at time 0, r is the subjective discount rate with r>0,θ t is an
independent and identically distributed preference shock with Pr[θt = 1] =
Pr[θt = 0] = 1
2,c t is consumption in period t, u(·) is a utility function that
is strictly concave and strictly increasing with u (0) =∞ , and u(0) = 0. For
convenience I will assume that there exists some ˆ q such that u(ˆ q)−ˆ q = 0.
Also, xt denotes production of goods, so that an agent suffers disutility from
producing. Thus, a given economic agent will wish to consume in some
periods and not in others, with the desire to consume determined at random.
An economic agent can in any period produce goods, at a cost in terms of
disutility. These goods can be consumed by someone else or can be used as
an input to an investment technology. These goods are otherwise perishable,
and an economic agent cannot consume his or her own output.
There are two sectors in the economy, the search sector, where economic
agents are randomly matched and can trade with each other, and the banking
sector, where an economic agent engages in banking transactions. An agent
has no choice about which sector to visit during a given period, in that with
probability π he or she visits the search sector, and with probability 1−π he
or she visits the banking sector. We have 0 <π<1.
If an agent is in the banking sector at the beginning of the period, that
agenthastheopportunitytofundaninvestmentproject. Thatis,aninvestment
project is indivisible and requires γ units of goods to initiate, where γ>0.
We will call the agent’s claim to the investment project a bank note, or private
money. This claim is indivisible and portable at no cost, but a given agent
can carry at most one bank note in inventory. At any time in the future, the
bank note can be redeemed. An agent who returns to the banking sector with
the bank note can interrupt the investment project and receive a return of
R units of consumption goods, which must then be consumed. The payoff
R is independent of when the project is interrupted, and once the project is
interrupted it will yield no more payoffs. Assume that u(R)−γ>0.One can
think of the “bank” here as a machine that yields an invisible bank note if γ
units of goods are inserted in it. At any period in the future, the bank note can
be inserted in the bank machine, in which case the bank machine will yield R
units of consumption goods.
Bank notes in the model are intended to capture some important features
of the bank liabilities that circulated in the United States before the Civil War
or in Canada prior to 1935. In these historical monetary regimes, bank notes
circulated hand-to-hand, and they were ultimately redeemable (typically in
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notes did not depend on the length of time between the issue of the note and
its redemption. To keep things simple, in the model some of the features
of historical bank note issue are assumed as part of the technology, but this
assumption is not important for my argument.
In period 0, a fraction M of the population is endowed with one unit each
of ﬁat money. Fiat money is assumed to be an intrinsically worthless and
indivisible object. Agents can hold at most one unit of some object, so in
equilibrium a given agent will be holding either one bank note, one unit of ﬁat
money, or nothing. The assumption that assets are indivisible is common in
search models of money, and this assumption is made for tractability. If assets
were divisible and it were feasible for a given agent to hold any nonnegative
quantityofaparticularasset,thenwewouldhavetotracktheentiredistribution
of assets across the population over time. In general, this would make the
model difﬁcult to work with.1 Given the assumption of indivisibility of assets
and the constraint that any given agent can hold only one unit of some asset,
we need only keep track of the fraction of agents in the population holding
each asset at each point in time.
If an agent is in the search sector at the beginning of the period, he or she
is matched with one other agent for the period. These matches are random
except that, for analytical convenience, every match is between an agent who
wishes to consume (θt = 1) and one who does not wish to consume (θt = 0).
Thus, I have ruled out matches where there is a double coincidence of wants
and both agents in the match wish to consume during the period, and where
neither agent wishes to consume. In order for exchange to take place in any
of the single-coincidence-of-wants matches, it must be the case that the agent
who wishes to consume has an asset (either a bank note or money) and the
agent who does not wish to consume has no asset. Clearly, if the agent who
wishes to consume has no asset, he or she has nothing to offer in exchange
for the other agent’s output, and if the agent who does not wish to consume
already has an asset, he or she will not accept more assets as he or she is not
able to carry them into the future.
Oneimportantassumptionisthatanagentcannotmakecontactwithother
agentsvisitingthebankingsectoratthesametime. Thatis,supposethatagents
arrive at the banking machine sequentially during the period. This prevents
agents from making trades while in the banking sector, which simpliﬁes the
model. A second important assumption is that agents meeting in the search
sectorknownothingaboutothers’tradinghistories. Withknowledgeoftrading
histories, it would be possible to support certain types of credit arrangements,
which we can think of as being similar to centralized credit card networks.
SuchcreditarrangementsarestudiedinAiyagariandWilliamson(1999,2000),
1 See, however, Green and Zhou (1998), Lagos and Wright (2000), and Shi (1997), where
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Williamson (1999), Temzelides and Williamson (2001a), and Kocherlakota
and Wallace (1998). Thus, the model environment rules out credit, which
makes it simpler to focus attention on the monetary arrangements of interest
here.
Equilibrium
I will conﬁne my attention here to steady state equilibria, where prices and
the distribution of assets across the population are constant over time. There
may exist other equilibria in this model, such as deterministic equilibria with
cycles and stochastic sunspot equilibria. However, these other equilibria are
moredifﬁculttoanalyze,andourpointscanbemadeinamorestraightforward
way by studying only steady states. The distribution of assets across agents
in a steady state is described by (ρ0,ρp,ρm), where ρ0 denotes the fraction
of agents in the population holding no asset, ρp is the fraction of agents
holding bank notes, and ρm is the fraction holding ﬁat money. We have
ρ0+ρp+ρm = 1.Next,qp isthepriceofabanknoteintermsofconsumption
goods. That is, qp is the quantity of consumption goods that an agent gives up
in equilibrium for a bank note. Similarly, qm denotes the price of ﬁat money.
The other variables we will need to determine are V0, the expected utility at
the end of the period associated with holding no asset, or the value to holding
nothing, and Vp and Vm, the values to holding a bank note and ﬁat money,
respectively.
Dynamic optimization by the economic agents in the model implies a set
































In equation (1), the value of holding no asset at the end of the current period
is determined by the opportunities this represents for trading in the following
period. These opportunities need to be discounted to the present using the
discount rate r. In the next period, with probability π the agent will be in the
search sector, and will meet an agent with nothing, with a bank note, or with
ﬁat money, with probabilities ρ0,ρ p, and ρm, respectively. If the agent is in
the search sector and meets another agent with nothing, clearly they cannot
trade and the agent’s value will then be V0 at the end of the next period.
However, if the agent meets someone with a bank note, trade can only take
placeiftheotheragentwishestoconsume,whichoccurswithprobability1/2.
If the other agent wishes to consume, then the agent decides whether to trade
or not based on what gives him or her the greatest utility. If he or she trades,
then qp goods must be produced at a utility cost of qp, and the agent receives
the bank note, with an associated value Vp and a net expected utility gain ofS. D. Williamson: Private Money 43
Vp − qp. However, should the agent not trade, value will remain the same at
V0. Similarly, if the agent meets someone with money, trade will occur only if
the other agent wishes to consume, and the agent will trade if Vm −qm >V 0,
and will not trade if Vm −qm <V 0. Now, if the agent is in the banking sector,
which occurs with probability 1−π,then he or she can choose to do nothing,
which yields a value at the end of the next period of V0, or a bank note could
be purchased, yielding expected utility Vp − γ.
It is somewhat simpler to rewrite the Bellman equation (1) by multiplying












max[Vm − qm − V0,0]
+(1 − π)max
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max[u(qm) + V0 − Vm,0]. (4)
Note in equation (3) that in the second term on the right-hand side, the holder
of the bank note redeems it in the banking sector only in the case where he
or she wishes to consume. Otherwise, it is preferable to continue to hold the
note so that it can be traded away or redeemed in the future. In equation (4),
the holder of ﬁat money obtains a return only in the search sector when he or
she meets an agent who holds no asset and wishes to consume.
Next, we need to describe how prices are determined in trades between
asset holders and those not holding assets. In general, two agents who can
potentially trade have a bargaining problem to solve, and the literature has
approached bargaining problems of this nature in a variety of ways including
using a Nash bargaining solution or a Rubinstein bargaining game (see Trejos
andWright[1995]). Here, Iwillfollowthesimplestpossibleapproach, which
is to assume that the asset holder has all of the bargaining power and makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent who holds no asset. That is, the asset
holder sets the price for the exchange in such a way that the other agent is just
indifferent between accepting the offer and declining. This gives
Vp − qp − V0 = 0, (5)44 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
and
Vm − qm − V0 = 0. (6)
EquilibriumWhere Bank Notes and Fiat Money Circulate
We will ﬁrst examine an equilibrium where bank notes and ﬁat money are
exchanged for goods in the search sector. Since some agents hold bank notes
and some agents hold no assets in such a steady state equilibrium, then when
the holder of a bank note redeems that note in the banking sector, he or she
mustbeindifferentbetweenacquiringanotherbanknoteandholdingnoasset.
Ifthiswerenotthecase,theneitherthesteadystatesupplyofbanknoteswould
be zero, or there would be no agents in the search sector with no assets, so
bank notes could not be used in exchange. We then have
Vp − γ = V0. (7)
Equations (2), (5), (6), and (7), then, imply that V0 = 0. That is, the value of
holding no asset is zero, since an agent with no asset then receives no surplus
from trading in the search sector with asset holders, and his or her value will
not change when visiting the banking sector. Given this, equation (7) implies




Since the equilibrium price of a bank note is γ,the constraint u(γ) − γ>0
states simply that there is a positive surplus associated with the exchange of a




[u(γ) − γ] +
(1 − π)
2
[u(R) − γ], (8)
and (8) is then an equation that solves for ρ0, that is,
ρ0 =
2rγ − (1 − π)[u(R) − γ]
π[u(γ) − γ]
. (9)
Since Vm = qm in equilibrium, we can substitute for Vm in equation (4), and
for now we can conjecture that it will always be in the interest of a holder of





[u(qm) − qm]. (10)
Equation (10) then solves for qm given the solution for ρ0 from (9). There
are two solutions to (10), one where qm = 0, and one where qm > 0. The
equilibrium where qm = 0 is uninteresting since the value of holding ﬁat
money is zero, and nothing can ever be purchased with ﬁat money. However,
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him or her any worse off. We will conﬁne our attention to the equilibrium
where qm > 0. Given this condition, from (10) we have u(qm) − qm > 0,
and our conjecture that the holder of ﬁat money is always willing to trade in
equilibrium is correct. An important result is that, from (8) and (10),
qm <q p = γ, (11)
thatis,privatebanknotesexchangeforgoodsinthesearchsectoratapremium
over ﬁat money. This result follows because bank notes have a redemption
value in the banking sector, while ﬁat money does not. Therefore, agents are
willing to pay more for the possibility of this higher future payoff.
Now, in the equilibrium we are examining where qm = Vm > 0, when
a holder of ﬁat money goes to the banking sector, he or she will not want
to acquire a bank note. Holding ﬁat money has strictly positive value, while
acquiring a bank note implies net expected utility Vp − γ = γ − γ = 0.
Thus, in a steady state, no one would want to dispose of ﬁat money balances.
This need not necessarily imply that it would never be in anyone’s interest to
dispose of money along the path the economy takes from the ﬁrst date to the
steadystate. However,supposethatthereisnoﬁatmoneyinexistence,thatthe
economy converges to a steady state, and that ﬁat money enters the economy
when the central bank chooses holders of bank notes at random in the search
sector and replaces each of their bank notes with one unit of ﬁat money. This
action will have no effect on the equilibrium, other than to replace bank notes
with ﬁat money one-for-one, and from the date when money was injected,
no one would dispose of ﬁat money. Therefore, in this sense we can take
ρm = M in equilibrium, so that the fraction of money holders in the steady
state is equal to the quantity of money injected by the central bank. Since
ρ0 +ρp +ρm = 1 in equilibrium, from our solution for ρ0 in equation (9) we
require that 0 <ρ 0 < 1 − M,which implies
0 < 2rγ − (1 − π)[u(R) − γ] <( 1 − M)π[u(γ) − γ] (12)
From (12), to support an equilibrium where private bank notes circulate, the
return on investment, R, cannot be too large or too small. If R is too small,
then investment will not be worthwhile, and no one would be willing to hold
bank notes. However, if R is too large, then the redemption value of a bank
note will be sufﬁciently attractive that no one will want to trade away a bank
note for goods in the search sector.
Note that if M = 1, then (12) does not hold for any values of γ,r,and
π,since the upper and lower bounds on 2rγ −(1−π)[u(R)−γ] in (12) are
then identical. Therefore, there is always some value for M that is sufﬁciently
large that (12) is not satisﬁed (note that the upper bound decreases with M),
andanequilibriumwithcirculatingbanknotesandvaluedﬁatmoneydoesnot
exist.46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
EquilibriumWhere Only Fiat Money Circulates
If ﬁat money circulates and there are no bank notes, then we have ρm = M,
ρ0 = 1 − M, and ρp = 0. From (6) and (2) we have V0 = 0 and Vm = qm,




[u(qm) − qm]. (13)
Just as in the previous subsection, I will ignore the equilibrium where qm = 0
and focus on the solution to (13) where qm > 0. Then, from equation (13),
u(qm)−qm > 0,soitwillalwaysbeintheinterestofanagentwithﬁatmoney
to trade it for goods, as I have implicitly conjectured. In an equilibrium where
only ﬁat money circulates, it cannot be in the interest of any agent to hold a
bank note. Were an agent to have a bank note, we would have Vp = qp, from




[u(qp) − qp] +
(1 − π)
2
[u(R) − qp]. (14)
Then, for it not to be in the interest of an agent to acquire a bank note, it must
be the case that Vp − γ ≤ 0, so that an agent prefers to hold no asset rather
than acquiring a bank note in the banking sector. This inequality then implies
that qp ≤ γ or, from (14),
2rγ − (1 − π)[u(R) − γ] ≥ (1 − M)π[u(γ) − γ] (15)
Now, deﬁning
φ ≡ 2rγ − (1 − π)[u(R) − γ], (16)
we can conclude from (12) and (15) that an equilibrium exists where bank
notes and ﬁat money circulate if
0 <φ<( 1 − M)π[u(γ) − γ], (17)
and that an equilibrium where only ﬁat money circulates as a medium of
exchange exists if
φ ≥ (1 − M)π[u(γ) − γ]. (18)
Inequalities (17) and (18) imply that we are more likely to see bank notes in
circulation as the redemption value of a bank note, R, increases (though recall
that this redemption value cannot be too large, as we require φ>0), and
that bank notes are less likely to circulate the larger is M,the quantity of ﬁat
moneyincirculation. Withanincreaseintheredemptionvalueofabanknote,
agents are much more willing to acquire notes to be used in exchange. Fiat
money displaces private money in circulation, so if the quantity of ﬁat money
is sufﬁciently large, then private money is driven out of the system.
Notethat, ifφ ≤ 0,thenasteadystateequilibriumwillexistwhereagents
acquire private money, but this private money is not exchanged in the searchS. D. Williamson: Private Money 47
sector. Private money is then just held until redemption occurs. As I am
primarily interested here in the medium of exchange role of private money, I
will assume throughout that φ>0.
Is It Efﬁcient for Fiat Money to Circulate?
Intheequilibriumstudiedabovewhereprivatebanknotesandﬁatmoneyboth
circulate, an increase in M, the stock of money in circulation, will displace
bank notes one-for-one. That is, since ρ0, the fraction of agents in the popu-
lation holding no assets, is determined by (9), which does not depend on M,
a change in M can only affect the fractions of agents holding ﬁat money and
bank notes. My interest in this section is in determining the welfare effects
of changes in M. Is it a good thing for government-supplied ﬁat money to
replace circulating bank notes?
To evaluate changes in welfare for this economy, I will use a welfare
criterion of average expected utility across the population in the steady state.
Letting W denote aggregate welfare, we have
W = ρ0V0 + ρpVp + ρmVm.
That is, aggregate welfare is just the weighted average of values (expected
utilities) across agents in the steady state. From above, in a steady state
equilibrium where bank notes and ﬁat money circulate, we have V0 = 0,
ρp = 1 − ρ0 − M,Vp = γ,ρm = M,and Vm = qm, where qm <γ.These
conditions give
W = (1 − ρ0 − M)γ + Mqm.
But since γ − qm > 0, an increase in M causes W to decrease, so welfare
falls as more ﬁat money is introduced. Ultimately, if M becomes sufﬁciently
large, then bank notes are driven out of the economy altogether. I can show
(with some work) that, no matter what M is, welfare cannot be higher when
only ﬁat money circulates than in an equilibrium where bank notes circulate.
Thekeyresulthereisthatﬁatmoneyalwaysreduceswelfare,whichistrue
because circulating bank notes serve two roles. First, bank notes serve as a
mediumofexchangeandthereforeenhancewelfarebyallowingforproduction
and consumption in the search sector that would otherwise not take place.
Second, bank notes support productive investment. The value of bank notes
as a medium of exchange encourages agents to hold these assets, and as a





in promoting productive investment.48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Prior to 1935, the assets used to back the circulating notes that Canadian
banks issued were essentially unrestricted. In fact, the issue of circulating
noteslargelyﬁnancedbankloansinCanada. Thiswascertainlynottrueinthe
UnitedStatespriortotheCivilWar,wherenoteswereissuedbystate-chartered
banks and were typically required to be backed by state bonds. Thus, we can
think of private bank notes as ﬁnancing public investment in the United States
and private investment in Canada. In either case, our model captures some
elements of the historical role of private money.
The view of private money from the model as I have laid it out thus far is
perhaps too sanguine. In practice some private money systems appear to have
worked poorly, while others have done quite well. In particular, the monetary
system in place prior to the Civil War in the United States certainly appears
to have worked poorly, though this is the subject of some debate (Rolnick et
al. 1997; Rolnick and Weber 1983, 1984). Indeed, the introduction of the
National Banking System in the United States in 1863 and the contempora-
neous introduction of a prohibitive tax on state bank notes appears to have
been motivated in good part by the view that the existing system of private
issue of bank notes by state-chartered banks was inefﬁcient. However, the
monetary system in Canada prior to 1935 seems to have been successful in
that the notes issued by chartered banks were essentially universally accepted
at par and there were only a few unusual circumstances of banks defaulting on
their notes (in the United States prior to the Civil War, there was widespread
discounting of private bank notes and there were many instances of default on
private bank notes).
Threeincentiveproblemsaretheprimarycausesofpotentialinefﬁciencies
in private money systems. First, there might be an “overissue” problem, as
discussed by Friedman (1960). That is, if there are many issuers of private
moneybehavingcompetitively, theywilltendtoissuenotestothepointwhere
they collectively drive the value of private money to zero. Cavalcanti, Erosa,
and Temzelides (1999) show, however, that each bank in a private money
system (such as the Suffolk Banking System in pre–Civil War New England
ortheCanadianbankingsystempriorto1935)couldhavesufﬁcientincentives
to prevent overissue. A key element in these systems was that each private
moneyissueracceptedthenotesofotherprivatemoneyissuersforredemption.
The second type of incentive problem arises because private money pro-
ducers might sell lemons (seeAkerlof [1971]). Williamson (1991) shows that
ifbanksdifferaccordingtothequalityoftheirassetportfolios, andtheholders
of bank notes have difﬁculty distinguishing quality, then the market could be
dominated by low-quality private bank notes that bear a low rate of return on
redemption. In these circumstances, it is possible that a prohibition on pri-
vate bank notes, with ﬁat money circulating as the sole medium of exchange,
would be the most efﬁcient monetary arrangement. While lemons problems
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War,theseproblemsappeartohavebeenlargelysolvedintheSuffolkBanking
System and in Canada prior to 1935. These two private money systems had
keyself-regulatorymechanismsthathelpedpreventlemonsproblems;further-
more, the Canadian system had an advantageously small number of private
note issuers.
The third type of incentive problem in private money systems is the po-
tential issue of counterfeits. In terms of its function as a medium of exchange,
a counterfeit is much like a lemon of extremely poor quality. If sufﬁcient
care is put into its production, the counterfeit will pass undetected in many
circumstances as a medium of exchange, but in contrast to a genuine bank
note it has no redemption value. While we might view Williamson (1991) as
applying to counterfeiting as well as to poor-quality banking, no one has an-
alyzed the counterfeiting problem in the context of a monetary search model.
Thus, exploring the implications of counterfeiting in our model in the next
section will prove useful.
2. A MODEL WITH COUNTERFEITING
One potential problem with a private money system is that this money may
be counterfeited. Indeed, the counterfeiting of private bank notes appears
to have been common in the United States prior to the Civil War. Clearly,
government-issued ﬁat currency is also subject to counterfeiting, but there
may exist economies of scale in counterfeit-prevention technologies and in
the enforcement of counterfeiting laws. Thus, the modiﬁcations I make in
the model will include the assumptions that private bank notes can be coun-
terfeited at some cost and that (for simplicity) the cost of counterfeiting ﬁat
money is inﬁnite. There will be a tradeoff, then, between the beneﬁts from the
circulation of private money—the promotion of productive investment—and
the costs of private money—the promotion of inefﬁcient counterfeiting. I will
show that there are circumstances in which the possibility of counterfeiting
fundamentally changes the nature of the equilibria that can exist. Indeed, a
ban on private money may be necessary to support a stationary equilibrium
with monetary exchange.
I will assume that a counterfeit bank note can be created when an agent
is in the banking sector, at a cost δ in units of goods, where 0 <δ<γ,so
that it is more costly to produce a genuine bank note than a counterfeit. This
counterfeit note can potentially be exchanged for goods in the search sector,
butthereisnoinvestmentprojectbackingthenote,andsoithasnoredemption
value. Inmeetingswithotheragentsinthesearchsector,acounterfeitnotecan
be detected with probability η, if it is offered in exchange, where 0 <η<1,
but otherwise the counterfeit goes undetected and is indistinguishable from
a private bank note. If a counterfeit is detected, then it is conﬁscated and50 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
destroyed. We will let ρf denote the fraction of agents holding counterfeit
notes in equilibrium, with ρ0 + ρp + ρm + ρf = 1.
We determine the value of holding a counterfeit, Vf, in a manner similar











(V0 − Vf). (19)
In equation (19), note in the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side that if the coun-
terfeit goes undetected, it sells at the same price as a private bank note which
cannot be identiﬁed—that is, at the price qu, which is the price of a bank note
of unidentiﬁed quality. Also note, in the second term, that if detection takes
place in the search sector, the note is conﬁscated and the agent will have value
V0 at the end of the period. I assume for convenience that counterfeits can
always be recognized in the banking sector. Thus, an agent with a counter-
feit bank note arriving in the banking sector will hide the counterfeit and not
attempt to redeem it.
We also need to modify equation (2), since agents with no asset can en-
counter an agent with a counterfeit note with whom they might trade. We
have
rV0 =


















max[Vm − qm − V0,0]
+(1 − π)max
 
0,V p − γ − V0,V f − δ − V0
 
. (20)
In the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (20), the agent sometimes
cannot distinguish between a genuine bank note offered in exchange and a
counterfeit. In this circumstance, I assume that if the agent accepts the note,
he or she learns before the end of the period whether or not it is a counterfeit.
Whether the note is accepted depends on the expected value of the note to the
agent. In the second term on the right-hand side, the agent has encountered an
agent with a bank note and has been able to verify that it is not a counterfeit.
The third term on the right-hand side of equation (20) takes account of the
agent’s opportunity to produce a counterfeit bank note when in the banking




















−γ,V 0 − Vp,V f − δ − Vp
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Equation (21) takes account of the fact that an agent with a bank note can
potentially encounter agents with assets who both recognize and do not rec-
ognize his or her bank note as not being a counterfeit; it also accounts for the
fact that the agent can create a counterfeit in the banking sector when a bank
note is redeemed. Equation (4) remains the same.
Intradeswheretheholderofabanknoteorcounterfeitmakesatake-it-or-
leave-it offer to an agent holding no asset who does not recognize the quality
of the asset, we obtain
ρpVp + ρfVf
ρp + ρf
− qu − V0 = 0, (22)




bank notes circulate, but where it is in no one’s interest to issue a counterfeit.
Second, it could be that only ﬁat money circulates as a medium of exchange,
with no bank notes in circulation, and therefore with no opportunities for
circulating counterfeits. Third, ﬁat money, bank notes, and counterfeits could
all circulate in equilibrium. We will consider each of these possibilities in
turn.
Bank Notes and Fiat Money Circulate, with No
Counterfeiting
This equilibrium is similar in most respects to that considered in the previous
section, where bank notes and ﬁat money circulate but there are no opportu-
nities to issue counterfeits. That is, equations (7), (8), (9), (10), and (12) all
hold. Here, given that there are opportunities to counterfeit, it cannot be in
the economic interest of anyone to issue a counterfeit in equilibrium.





[(1 − η)u(γ) − Vf], (23)
where φ is deﬁned as in (16). That is, if a counterfeit were issued, it would
be negligible relative to the quantity of notes in circulation, and it would trade
at the price qu = γ so long as it went undetected when offered in exchange.
For it not to be in the interest of an agent to issue a counterfeit when in the
banking sector, we must have Vf ≤ δ, which gives, from (23),
φ[(1 − η)u(γ) − δ] ≤ 2rδ[u(γ) − γ]. (24)52 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Thus, since φ>0, (24) essentially states that the cost of counterfeiting,
δ, must be sufﬁciently large and the probability of detection η must also be
sufﬁcientlylargeforthisequilibriumtoexist. However,notethatevenifη = 0
and no counterfeits can be detected in use, (24) will hold if δ is sufﬁciently
large. It is also true that, for any δ>0 there is some sufﬁciently large value
for η such that (24) will hold. That is, a sufﬁciently high detection probability
will discourage counterfeits no matter how cheap they are to produce.
Anotherinterpretationofcondition(24)isthefollowing. Supposethatthe
economy is in a steady state equilibrium with circulating private money and
ﬁat money and an inﬁnite cost of producing counterfeits. Then suppose that
there was an unanticipated innovation to the counterfeiting technology that
reduced δ so that condition (24) did not hold. It would then be in the interest
ofagentstoissuecounterfeits,whichwouldupsetthesteadystateequilibrium.
Only Fiat Money Circulates
When counterfeiting is possible, a potential outcome is that private money
is not issued in equilibrium, and only ﬁat money circulates as a medium of
exchange. Counterfeits would always be identiﬁable in such an equilibrium,
since there would be no private money in circulation, and it would then be
an equilibrium for no one to accept counterfeits. This equilibrium will be
identical in all respects to the one considered in the previous section, where
counterfeiting was not possible. Thus, for this equilibrium to exist, condition
(18) must hold.
Bank Notes, Fiat Money, and Counterfeits Circulate
In the ﬁnal case I consider, bank notes, ﬁat money, and counterfeits are all
exchanged for goods in the search sector. This is the most complicated of the
three cases to analyze.
Here, since an agent who holds no asset never receives any surplus in
trading, we will have V0 = 0.Also, when an agent is in the banking sector and
is not holding an asset, then he or she must be indifferent among the following





offered for sale in the search sector. Thus, it must be the case that agents are
indifferent among the above three options in the steady state. Thus, we must
have V0 = Vp − γ = Vf − δ.Then, given that V0 = 0, we have Vp = γ and






From (19) and (21) we obtain, respectively,




ηu(γ) + (1 − η)u(qu) − γ
 
+ (1 − π)[u(R) − γ]. (27)
Then, equations (26) and (27) solve for ρ0 and qu, and since ρp +ρf +ρm =
1 − ρ0, and ρm = M, then given a solution for qu, we can use (25) to solve
for ρp and ρf. Solving (26) and (27) for ρ0 and u(qu), we obtain
ρ0 =
φ − 2rδ
π[ηu(γ) − γ + δ]
, (28)
u(qu) =
δφ − 2rδ(1 − η)u(γ)
(φ − 2rδ)(1 − η)
. (29)
Now, we require that 0 <ρ 0 < 1 − M,or, from (28),
2rδ<φ<π( 1 − M)[ηu(γ) − γ + δ] + 2rδ. (30)
Also, (25) implies that u(qu) < u(γ) and u(qu) > u(δ) so, respectively, from
(29), we must have






But (30) then implies that φ>0, since δ>0, and (32) implies φ<0, since
δ<γand u(γ) − γ>0. This resulting contradiction tells us that this type
of equilibrium cannot exist.
A Prohibition on Private Bank Notes
Suppose now that the government can prohibit the issue of private bank notes.
That is, assume that the government has the ability to monitor the production
ofbanknotes,butisnotabletomonitortheproductionofcounterfeits. Then,if
there is a public prohibition on the production of private bank notes, everyone
knows that a note offered in exchange is a counterfeit. There is then a steady
state equilibrium in which counterfeits are never accepted in exchange, but
ﬁat money is.
In this equilibrium, the price obtained for ﬁat money in exchange, qm, is
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moneycirculatesbutprivatebanknoteissueispermitted,wedonotrequirethat
condition (18) holds here for an equilibrium to exist. That is, an equilibrium
where ﬁat money circulates under the prohibition of private money exists for
all parameter values.
Existence of a Stationary Equilibrium
I have now determined that, if an equilibrium exists, it must either be one
where bank notes and ﬁat money circulate and counterfeits do not, or where
only ﬁat money circulates. Further, there are restrictive conditions under
which ﬁat money will circulate when private money issue is permitted, and an
equilibrium where ﬁat money circulates always exists when private money
issue is prohibited. In this section I want to explore the possibilities for
existence of stationary equilibria under counterfeiting and what they mean
for the design of monetary systems.
For an equilibrium with the coexistence of ﬁat money and bank notes, we
know from above that conditions (17) and (24) must hold. Alternatively, for
an equilibrium with ﬁat money only, when private money issue is permitted,
condition (18) must hold. Now, if
δ ≥
(1 − M)π(1 − η)u(γ)
2r + (1 − M)π
, (33)
then if (17) holds, so does (24); under these circumstances the potential issue
of counterfeits is irrelevant. That is, if counterfeiting is sufﬁciently costly, as
deﬁnedby(33),thensolongasφ>0,astationaryequilibriumwithmonetary
exchange exists where either private money and ﬁat money circulate (if (17)
holds) or where only ﬁat money circulates (if (18) holds).
Now, if
δ<
(1 − M)π(1 − η)u(γ)






(1 − η)u(γ) − δ
,(1 − M)π[u(γ) − γ]
 
, (35)
then no equilibrium exists where private money issue is permitted. Under
these circumstances, where the cost of counterfeiting is sufﬁciently small, a
stationary equilibrium with monetary exchange can only be supported if there
is a prohibition on private money issue.
Thus, the potential for counterfeiting makes a key difference here for the
effectsofgovernmentinterventionintheissueofmediaofexchange. Without
thepossibilityofcounterfeiting,thecirculationofprivatemoneyisunambigu-
ously good for economic welfare. If private money were banned under these
circumstances, welfare would decrease, and even the introduction of moreS. D. Williamson: Private Money 55
government-supplied ﬁat money into the economy would be detrimental as it
inefﬁciently displaces private money. However, if counterfeiting is possible
at a sufﬁciently low cost, then there can be a classic market failure of the type
that can occur in the lemons model of Akerlof (1971). That is, there cannot
be an equilibrium where private money and counterfeits coexist, but the issue
of private money would induce a ﬂood of counterfeits, so an equilibrium can
only exist if there is a prohibition on the issue of private money. Monetary
exchange in this case is supported with government supplied ﬁat money and
a ban on private money.
3. CONCLUSION
I have shown, with the aid of a search model of money, some of the beneﬁts
and costs of a monetary system where private money can be issued. The
issue of private money yields a social beneﬁt in that it leads to productive
ﬁnancial intermediation, which can increase welfare. However, the potential
for counterfeiting in this system can also lead to the possibility that monetary
exchange can be supported only if private money issue is prohibited.
Though my analysis yields some interesting insights, there are important
qualiﬁcationstowhatIhavedonehere. First,Imadeaverysimpleassumption
in the model: that ﬁat money could not be counterfeited, while private money
could be counterfeited at a cost. While it may be the case that there exist
economies of scale in monitoring for counterfeit money, which could imply
the optimality of a government monopoly in currency provision, it seems
unlikely that ﬁat money would in general be more difﬁcult to counterfeit than
private money. The cost of counterfeiting depends in part on the technology
used to produce the money that the counterfeiter is trying to replicate. For
example, the new Federal Reserve $20 note is much harder to counterfeit
than the old one. In a world with many private money issuers, each private
moneyissuermayinvesttoolittleinfoilingcounterfeitersrelativetothesocial
optimum, and it could be that some form of government intervention would
correct this market failure. However, to address this issue properly would
require a more complicated model with alternative private money production
technologies.
Second,akeyfeatureofthemonetarysearchmodelthatlendsittractability
is that money is indivisible. Of course, money is certainly indivisible in
practice, but the fact that we cannot divide money into denominations smaller
than one cent cannot matter much. In our model, agents can carry at most one
unit of money, and as a result money is not neutral, which is an undesirable
property of the model. Changing the number of units of money in existence
will change real variables in the model in the long run, and this was important
for some of our results. In particular, we should be skeptical that the result
in Section 1 that ﬁat money displaces private money one-for-one would hold56 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
if money were perfectly divisible. Some authors, in particular Lagos and
Wright(2000)andShi(1997),havestudiedtractablesearchmodelsofdivisible
money. However, it remains to be seen whether these models have much to
contribute above and beyond, for example, standard cash-in-advance models.
The model in this article can be extended to examine issues related to the
clearing and settlement of private monies, as in Temzelides and Williamson
(2001a,b). Amorecompletemodelofbankingcanbeembeddedinthisframe-
work, too, wherethebanksinthemodelsharesomeofthefeaturesofbanksin
practice, such as diversiﬁcation and the transformation of assets (seeWilliam-
son [1999]).
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